We give explicit constructions of extractors which work for a source of any min-entropy on strings of length n. The first construction extracts any constant fraction of the min-entropy using O(log 2 n) additional random bits. The second extracts all the min-entropy using O(log 3 n) additional random bits. Both of these constructions use fewer truly random bits than any previous construction which works for all min-entropies and extracts a constant fraction of the min-entropy. We then improve our second construction and show that we can reduce the entropy loss to 2 log(1=")+O(1) bits, while still using O(log 3 n) truly random bits (where entropy loss is defined as (source min-entropy) + (# truly random bits used) ? (# output bits)], and " is the statistical difference from uniform achieved). This entropy loss is optimal up to a constant additive term.
Introduction
Roughly speaking, an extractor is a function which extracts (almost) truly random bits from a weak random source, using a small number of additional random bits as a catalyst. A large body of work has focused on giving explicit constructions of extractors, as such constructions have a wide variety of applications. A recent breakthrough was made by Luca Trevisan [Tre98] , who discovered that the Nisan-Wigderson pseudorandom generator [NW94] , previously only used in a computational setting, could be used to construct extractors. For certain settings of the parameters, Trevisan's extractor is optimal and improves on previous constructions. More explicitly, Trevisan's extractor improves over previous constructions in the case of extracting a relatively small number of random bits (e.g., extracting k 1? bits from source with "k bits of randomness", where > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant) with a relatively large statistical difference from uniform distribution (e.g., constant ", where " is the statistical difference from uniform distribution required from the output). However, when one wants to extract more than a small fraction of the randomness from the weak random source, or when one wants to achieve a small statistical difference from uniform distribution, Trevisan's extractor performs poorly (in that a large number of truly random "catalyst" bits are needed).
In this paper, we show that Trevisan's ideas can be used in a more general and efficient way. We present two new ideas that improve Trevisan's construction. The first idea allows one to extract more than a small fraction of the randomness from the weakly random source. In particular, the idea can be used to extract all of the randomness from the weak random source. This is accomplished by improving the combinatorial construction underlying the NisanWigderson generator used in Trevisan's construction. Applying a result of Wigderson and Zuckerman [WZ95] to these extractors, we also obtain improved constructions of highly expanding graphs and superconcentrators.
The second idea improves Trevisan's construction in the case where the output bits are required to be of a relatively small statistical difference from uniform distribution. The two ideas can be combined, and the final outcome is a set of new extractors that use fewer truly random bits than any previous construction which extracts at least a constant fraction of the randomness from any weak random source. duced distribution EXT(X; U d ) on f0; 1g m has statistical difference at most " from uniform (where U d is the uniform distribution on f0; 1g d ). In other words, EXT extracts m (almost) truly random bits from a source with k bits of hidden randomness using d additional random bits as a catalyst. The goal is to explicitly construct extractors which minimize d (ideally, d = O(log(n="))) while m is as close to k as possible. 1 Dispersers are the analogue of extractors for one-sided error; instead of inducing the uniform distribution, they simply hit all but a " fraction of points in f0; 1g m with nonzero probability.
Previous work. Dispersers were first defined by Sipser [Sip88] and extractors were first defined by Nisan and Zuckerman [NZ96] . Much of the motivation for research on extractors comes from work done on "somewhat random sources" [SV86, CG88, Vaz87b, VV85, Vaz84, Vaz87a] . There have been a number of papers giving explicit constructions of dispersers and extractors, with a steady improvement in the parameters [Zuc96, NZ96, WZ95, GW97, SZ98, SSZ98, NT98, Zuc97, TS98b, Tre98] . Most of the work on extractors is based on techniques such as k-wise independence, the Leftover hash lemma [ILL89] , and various forms of composition. A new approach to constructing extractors was recently initiated by Trevisan [Tre98] , who discovered that the Nisan-Wigderson pseudorandom generator [NW94] could be used to construct extractors.
Explicit constructions of extractors and dispersers have a wide variety of applications, including simulating randomized algorithms with weak random sources [Zuc96] ; constructing oblivious samplers [Zuc97] ; constructive leader election [Zuc97] ; randomnessefficient error reduction in randomized algorithms and interactive proofs [Zuc97] ; explicit constructions of expander graphs, superconcentrators, and sorting networks [WZ95] ; hardness of approximation [Zuc96] ; pseudorandom generators for space-bounded computation [NZ96, RR99] ; derandomizing BPP under circuit complexity assumptions [ACR97, STV98] ; and other problems in complexity theory [Sip88, GZ97] .
For a detailed survey of previous work on extractors and their applications, see [NT98] .
Our results. The first family of extractors constructed in this paper are given in the following theorem: In particular, using the second extractor with k = m, we can extract all of the min-entropy of the source using O ? log 2 (n=") log k additional random bits. (If " is constant then this is just O(log 2 n log k) additional random bits). Using the first extractor with k=m constant, we can extract any constant fraction of the min-entropy of the source using O ? log 2 (n=") additional random bits. (If " is constant then this is just O(log 2 n) additional random bits).
1 Actually, since the extractor is fed d truly random bits in addition to the k bits of hidden randomness, one can hope to have m be close to k + d. This will be discussed in more detail under the heading "Entropy loss."
An undesirable feature of the extractors in Theorem 1 (and the extractor of Trevisan [Tre98] ) is that the number of truly random bits depends quadratically on log(1="). In (nonconstructive) optimal extractors and even some previous constructions (discussed later), this dependence is linear. Indeed, some applications of extractors, such as [RR99] , require a linear dependence. In our second theorem, we improve our extractors to have a linear dependence on log(1="). Thus, in all cases, the log 2 (n=") in Theorem 1 has been replaced with log 2 n log(1="), which is an improvement when " is relatively small. One case of note is when we want to extract m = k 1? bits from a source of min-entropy k n , for an arbitrarily small constant > 0. This is the case in which Trevisan's extractor performs best, using d = O(log 2 (n=")= log n) truly random bits (which is O(log n) for constant " 1=poly(n)). In this case, Theorem 2 gives d = O (log n log(1=")) ;
which is an improvement for small ".
A summary of our results is given in Figure 1 . A comparison with the best previous constructions is given in Figure 2 . Trevisan's construction [Tre98] uses only O(log 2 (n=")= log k) truly random bits but extracts only a small fraction (k 1? ) of the source min-entropy. The best previous construction that extracts all of the source min-entropy was given by Ta-Shma [NT98] and used O(log 9 n log(1=")) truly random bits. 2 Our extractors use more truly random bits than the extractor of [Zuc97] and the disperser of [TS98b] , but our extractors have the advantage that they work for any min-entropy (unlike [Zuc97] ), and are extractors rather than dispersers (unlike [TS98b] ). The disadvantage of the extractors of [GW97] described in Figure 2 is that they only use a small number of truly random bits when the source min-entropy k is very close to the input length n (e.g., k = n ? polylog(n)). There are also extractors given in [GW97, SZ98] which extract all of the minentropy, but these use a small number of truly random bits only when the source min-entropy is very small (e.g., k = polylog(n)), and these extractors are better discussed later in the context of entropy loss.
Plugging the second extractor of Theorem 1 into a construction of [WZ95] (see also [NT98] 2 In [NT98] , the number of truly random bits used by the extractor is given as d = polylog n, a polynomial of unspecified degree in log n. Ta-Shma [TS98a] estimates the degree of this polynomial to be 9.
3 By explicitly constructible, we mean that, given N and K, the graph can be constructed deterministically in time poly(N ).
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Above, is an arbitrarily small constant. NWS;P (y) = P(yjS 1 ) P(yjS m ):
In the "indistinguishability proof" of [NW94] , it is shown that for any function D: f0; 1g m ! f0; 1g which distinguishes the output of NWS;P (y) (for uniformly selected y) from the uniform distribution on f0; 1g m , there is a "small" circuit C (or procedure of small "description size") such that C D ( ) (i.e. , C with oracle access to D) approximates P( ) reasonably well. It is shown that the size of the C is related to max i6 =j jSi \ Sjj, so one should use a collection of sets in which this quantity is small, while trying to minimize the seed length d.
We now give a rough description of the Trevisan extractor EXT: f0; 1g n f0; 1g d ! f0; 1g m : For a string u 2 f0; 1g n , let u 2 f0; 1g n be an encoding of u in an error-correcting code and define`= log n. We view u as a Boolean function u: f0; 1g`! f0; 1g. As above, we fix a collection S = (S1; : : : ; Sm) of subsets of d] of size`.
Then the extractor is simply EXTS (u; y) = NWS; u (y) = u(yjS 1 ) u(yjS m ):
The analysis of this extractor in [Tre98] shows that the output of this extractor is close to uniform as long as the source min-entropy required is greater than the size of the circuit built in the security reduction of [NW94] . Hence, one needs to make sure this circuit size is not much larger than the number m of output bits while minimizing the number d of truly random bits needed, which is equal to the seed length of the Nisan-Wigderson generator.
Our main improvements. The first improvement of this paper stems from the observation that actually maxi P j<i 2 jS i \S j j is much better than max i6 =j jSi \ Sjj as a measure of the size of the circuit built in the Nisan-Wigderson security reduction. So we are left with the problem of constructing set systems in which this quantity is small; we call such set systems weak designs (in contrast to designs, in which max i6 =j jSi \ Sjj is bounded). We show that with weak designs, one can have d much smaller than is possible with the corresponding designs. The weak designs used in the first extractor of Theorem 1 are constructed using an application of the Probabilistic Method, which we then derandomize using the Method of Conditional Expectations (see [ASE92] and [MR95, Ch. 5]). We then apply a simple iteration to these first weak designs to obtain the weak designs used in the second extractor. We also prove a lower bound showing that our weak designs are near-optimal.
The second improvement is achieved by using a specific errorcorrecting code rather than an arbitrary one. More specifically, we use multilinear error-correcting codes over finite fields. In Trevisan's analysis for the size of the circuit C, the fact that u is an error-correcting code (rather than just an arbitrary funct ion) is not used. The circuit complexity of the function u, restricted to the subset of inputs Si \ Sj, is hence bounded by O(2 jS i \S j j ).
Sometimes, however, this is a very bad upper bound. For example, the circuit complexity of the function u itself (without restriction) is O(2 n ) which is sometimes much smaller than O(2 n ). This gap is significant when " is relatively small (because small " requires an error-correcting code with very good distance properties, which in turn requires long codewords.) Here, we suggest that if one uses multilinear error-correcting codes and constructs the weak designs appropriately then the circuit complexity of the function u, restricted to the subset of inputs Si \Sj, can be bounded by a value much smaller than 2 jS i \S j j .
Entropy loss. Since a (k; ")-extractor EXT: f0; 1g n f0; 1g d ! f0; 1g m is given k bits of hidden randomness in its first input and d truly random bits in its second input, one can actually hope for the output length m to be almost k +d, rather than just k. The quantity = k + d ? m is therefore called the entropy loss of the extractor. Hence, in this language, the goal in constructing extractors is to simultaneously minimize both d and the entropy loss.
Nonconstructively, one can show that, for any n and k n, there exist extractors EXT n;k : f0; 1g n f0; 1g d ! f0; 1g k+d? with d = log(n ? k) + 2 log(1=") + O(1) and entropy loss = 2 log(1=") + O(1), and these bounds on d and are tight up to additive constants [RT97] . The explicit constructions, however, are still far from achieving these parameters. As for what is known, every entry in Figure 2 has an entropy loss of k + d?m, by definition. For example, the extractor of [GW97] has an entropy loss of O(n?k+log(1=")) (which is only interesting when k is very close to n) and the extractor of [NT98] and the disperser of [TS98b] have entropy losses of polylog n. In addition, the "tiny families of hash functions" of [SZ98] give extractors with d = O(k + log n) and entropy loss 2 log(1=") + O(1); these have optimal entropy loss but are only interesting when k is very small (e.g., k = polylog n), as d is linear in k.
By combining the second extractors of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 with extractors of [SZ98] , we are able to achieve optimal entropy loss (up to an additive constant): Improved pseudorandom generators. Using a relaxed notion of designs also gives some quantitative improvements over [NW94] in the construction of pseudorandom generators from hard Boolean functions. Details of these improvements are given in the full version of this paper.
Preliminaries
"log" indicates the logarithm base 2 and "ln" denotes the natural logarithm. If X is a probability distribution on a finite set, we write x X to indicate that x is selected according to X. Two distributions X and Y on a set S are said to have statistical difference (or
where the maximum is taken over all functions ("distinguishers") D: f0; 1g m ! f0; 1g. A distribution X is said to have min-entropy k if for all x, Pr X = x] 2 ?k . It is useful to think of distributions of min-entropy k as being uniform over a subset of the domain of size 2 k .
We write Uj for the uniform distribution on strings of length j. Notice that the dependence on is very poor. In particular, if we want to extract a constant fraction of the min-entropy, we need more than m c truly random bits for some c > 0. This is unavoidable with the current definition of designs: if < 2, then all the sets must be disjoint, so d m`. In general, we have the following lower bound, proved in the full version of the paper. The first improvement of this paper stems from the observation that actually a weaker form of design suffices for the NisanWigderson generator and the construction of extractors:
4 There is a somewhat related notion in the combinatorics literature known as a 2-design (see, e.g. [AK92] ). In 2-designs, strong additional regularity requirements are imposed (such as all the pairwise intersections being exactly the same size and all points being contained in the same number of sets). These additional requirements are irrelevant in our applications. We will show that the parameters of a weak design correspond to the parameters of our extractors in the same way that designs corresponded to the parameters of Trevisan's extractor. Notice that every (`; )-design is a weak (`; )-design. But one can, for many settings of m,`, and , achieve weak (`; )-designs S1; : : : ; Sm d] with much smaller values of d than possible with (`; )-designs. Indeed, we will prove the following in Section 6 using a probabilistic argument: Moreover, such a family can be found in time poly(m; d).
In particular, we can take = (1=m) and extract essentially all of the entropy of the source using d = O(`2 log m) truly random bits. Lemma 10 will be proven in Section 6.
For extractors which use only O(log n) truly random bits, where n is the input length, one would need d = O(`). However, one cannot hope to do better than (`2) using the current analysis with weak designs. Indeed, the following proposition, proved in the full version of the paper, shows that our weak designs are optimal up to the log(1= ) factor in our second construction. Proposition 11 For every (`; )-weak design S1; : : : ; Sm d], d min `2 2 log 2 ; m2
Notice that d = m`can be trivially achieved having all the sets disjoint and that log 2 approaches 1 as approaches 1, so the lower bound for 1 is essentially (`2).
The extractor
In this section, we describe the Trevisan extractor and analyze its performance when used with our weak designs. The description of the extractor follows [Tre98] very closely. The main tool in the Trevisan extractor is the Nisan-Wigderson generator [NW94] . Let S = (S1; : : : ; Sm) be a collection of subsets of d] of size`, and let P: f0; 1g`! f0; 1g be any Boolean function. For a string y 2 f0; 1g d , define yjS i to be the string in f0; 1g`obtained by projecting y onto the coordinates specified by Si. Then the NisanWigderson generator NWS;P is defined as NWS;P (y) = P(yjS 1 ) P(yjS m ):
In addition to the Nisan-Wigderson generator, the Trevisan extractor makes use of error-correcting codes:
Lemma 12 (error-correcting codes) For every n and there is a code EC n; : f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g n where n = poly(n; 1= ) such that every Hamming ball of relative radius 1=2 ? in f0; 1g n contains at most 1= 2 codewords. Furthermore, EC n; can be evaluated in time poly(n; 1= ) and n can be assumed to be a power of
2.
We can now describe the Trevisan extractor, which takes as parameters n, m, k, and ", where m k n. Let EC: f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g n be as in Lemma 12, with = "=4m and define`= log n = O(log n="). For u 2 f0; 1g n , we view EC(u) as a Boolean function u: f0; 1g`! f0; 1g. Let S = (S1; : : : ; Sm) be a collection of subsets of d] (for some d) such that jSij =`for each i. (How S is selected will crucially affect the performance of the extractor; we will later choose it to be one of our weak designs.) Then the extractor EXTS : f0; 1g n f0; 1g d ! f0; 1g m is defined as EXTS (u; y) = NWS; u (y) = u(yjS 1 
) u(yjS m ):
We will now analyze this extractor. The following lemma, due to Yao, allows us to focus on "next-bit predictors" instead of distinguishers. The improvement over [NW94, Tre98] in Lemma 14 is the use of P j<i 2 jS i \S j j rather than m 2 max i jS i \S j j in the bound on jFij.
Lemma 13 ([Yao82])
This refined bound illustrates the connection with weak designs.
Proof: Let

= Pr y A ? P(yjS 1 ) P(yjS i?1 ) = P(yjS i )
By an averaging argument we can fix all the bits of y outside Si while preserving the prediction probability. Renaming yjS i as x, we now observe that x varies uniformly over f0; 1g`while P(yjS j ) for j 6 = i is now a function Pj of x that depends on only jSi \ Sjj bits of x. So, we have Pr x A (P1(x) Pi?1(x)) = P(x)] :
Therefore, it suffices to let Fi be the set of functions f of the form x 7 ! (P1(x); P2(x); : : : ; Pi?1(x)), where Pj(x) depends only some set Tij of bits of x, where jTijj = jSi \ Sjj. The number of bits it takes to represent each Pj is 2 jT ij j = 2 jS i \S j j . So, the total number of bits it takes to represent a function in Fi is at most P j<i 2 jS i \S j j , giving the desired bound on log jFij. We now analyze the extractor EXTS when we take S to be a weak design. Since X has min-entropy k, each u 2 B has probability at most d 0 = O log 2 (n=") log(k=m) (resp., d 0 = O(log 2 (n=") log(1= ))). By using + 3 additional bits in the seed and simply concatenating these to the output, we obtain a (k; ")-extractor EXT: f0; 1g n f0; 1g d 0 + +3 ! f0; 1g m , as desired. (In applying Lemma 10, we need to make sure that < 3=2, but if 3=2, we can use the weak design of Lemma 9 instead.)
Reducing the error
The construction given above works well and improves over previous constructions when " is relatively large. However, the number d of truly random bits needed is quadratic in log(1="), which is not as good as the linear dependency achieved by some previous constructions. In this section, we improve this quadratic dependency in our constructions (and in Trevisan's construction) to a linear dependency. We only sketch the proof in this section, due to space constraints and the fact that the results have been superseded by our recent work (in preparation).
The quadratic dependence on log(1=") in our extractor arises from the fact that an (`; )-weak design requires a universe whose size grows quadratically with`(cf., Proposition 11). In the extractor of the previous section (and Trevisan's extractor),`is taken to be the logarithm of the length of the error-correcting code used (as we view codewords as functions P: f0; 1g`! f0; 1g). The analysis of the extractor reveals that in order to achieve a small statistical difference " from uniform, we must use an error-correcting code with very good distance properties; namely, one in which no Hamming ball of radius 1=2?O("=m) contains many codewords. However, an error-correcting code with such a strong distance property must have length at least poly(n; "), resulting in`= (log(n=")), and a seed length that is quadratic in log(1=").
The solution we give in this section is to use an error-correcting code over a large alphabet F, in which we view every codeword as a function from F`to F rather than a function from f0; 1g`to f0; 1g. Then it is possible to have a code with very good distance properties (relative to ") with`being independent of "; only the alphabet size F need depend on ". Using this approach, we encounter two problems. The first problem is that the function which computes the codeword P given a predictor A (as in Lemma 14)
will be built from functions of the form Pj: F jS i \S j j ! F. In the proof of Lemma 14, we bounded the description size of the Pj's by the description size of an arbitrary function F jS i \S j j ! F, which is 2 jS i \S j j when F = f0; 1g. But, as F increases in size, this bound on description size becomes too large to handle. The second problem is that, when we use a large alphabet, the output of the extractor consists of elements of F rather than bits. We will not be able to argue that these elements of F are uniformly distributed, but rather that the i'th element of F in the output is unpredictable given the first i ? 1 elements of F.
The solution to the first problem comes from our choice of error-correcting codes. We use multilinear error correcti ng codes (over finite fields) rather than the arbitrary error correcti ng codes used in Section 4. We can then make use of the fact that the restriction of a multilinear function to a subset of its input variables is still a multilinear function. We can hence bound the description size of that restriction by the description size of a multilinear function rather than the description size of an arbitrary function.
The second problem can be solved using standard techniques.
Specifically, the fact that the i'th component of the output is unpredictable given the first i ? 1 components means that the output is what is known as a block-wise source [CG88] . In our case, the block-wise source has blocks of logarithmic length, and standard techniques can be used to extract truly random bits from such a source using a small number of additional truly random bits.
Let F be some fixed finite field such that log jFj c log(n="),
where c is some sufficiently large constant (say c = 10). For " 1=n, the dependence on " in the extractors of Theorem 1 can be absorbed into the hidden constant. Thus, we will only need to use the constructions of this section in case " < 1=n, and hence we may assume that log jFj = O(log(1=")):
In this section, we think of an extractor EXT: f0; 1g n f0; 1g d ! f0; 1g m as a function EXT: F n 0 F d 0 ! F m 0 ; where n 0 = n=(log jFj), d 0 = d=(log jFj) and m 0 = m=(log jFj) (we assume for simplicity that n 0 ; d 0 ; m 0 , log n 0 , and log jFj are all integer).
Let S = (S1; : : : ; S m 0) be a collection of subsets of d 0 ] such that jSij =`for each i, and let P: F`! F be any function. For a string y 2 F d 0 , define yjS i to be the string in F`obtained by projecting y onto the coordinates specified by Si. Then we define NW 0 S;P as NW 0 S;P (y) = P(yjS 1 ) P(yjS m 0 ):
We will use in this section`= log n 0 ; note that`is bounded by log n, independent of ". Let G be the set of all functions from Ft o F. There are jFj 2`= jFj n 0 multilinear functions from F`to F (one needs to specify 2`coefficients), so we may define an errorcorrecting code EC: F n 0 ! G which associates to each element u of F n 0 a distinct multilinear function EC(u) = u: F`! F. has large min-entropy ( log jFj bits) given all its predecessors.
That is, it is a "block-wise source" in the sense of [CG88] , in which the min-entropy of each block given the predecessors is a constant fraction of its length (which is log jFj). We can now construct an extractor from EXTS in one of the following ways:
1. By applying on the entire output EXT(X; U d ) the extractor of [Zuc97] that extracts a constant fraction of the min-entropy as long as the min-entropy is at least a constant fraction of the number of bits.
2. By applying on each element of EXT(X; U d ) a pairwise independent hash function h : f0; 1g log jFj ! f0; 1g 0 log jFj , where 0 is some small constant (we can apply the same hash function on all the elements).
Both ways are very efficient in terms of the number of additional random bits needed. The first part of Theorem 2 is now obtained by using the weak designs given by Lemmas 9 (as in the proof of Theorem 1). The resulting seed length (using an (`; )-weak design for = (k ? c log jFj)=m) is
However, the number of bits we extract is only 0 log jFj m 0 = 0 m 0 k= , for some constant 0 < 1. Hence, we can only directly use this to extract upto a small constant fraction of the minentropy (even if we use the weak designs of Lemma 10). In order to extract more of the min-entropy of the source, we will need to use iterations, as in [WZ95] . A constant number of iterations will allow us to extract any constant fraction of the min-entropy. In general, to obtain m = k=(1 + ), we will need O(log(1= )) iterations and hence we need O ? log 2 n log(1=") log(1= ) additional random bits. Supppose we have S1; : : : ; Si?1 d] satisfying the above conditions. We prove that there exists a set Si satisfying the required conditions using the Probabilistic Method [ASE92] (see also [MR95, Ch. 5]). Let a1; : : : ; a`be uniformly and independently selected elements of B1; : : : ; B`, respectively, and then let Si = fa1; : : : ; a`g. We will argue that with nonzero probability, Condition 2 holds. Let Y j;k be the indicator random variable for the event a k 2 Sj, so Pr Y j;k = 1] = 1=jB k j = 1=d`= ln e. Notice that for a fixed j, the random variables Yj;1; : : : ; Y j;`a re independent.
A straightforward calculation shows that Hence, with nonzero probability, Condition 2 holds, so a set Si satisfying the requirements exists. However, we want to find such a set deterministically. This can be accomplished by a straightforward application of the Method of Conditional Expectations (see [ASE92] and [MR95, Ch. 5]). Details can be found in the full version of the paper. Now we define our weak design S1; : : : ; Sm. For each t 2 h], we let Sn t+1 ; : : : ; Sn t+mt Bt be a weak (`; 2)-design as given by Lemma 9. In other words, we take the ordered union of h weak (`; 2)-designs (consisting of m1; m2; : : : ; m h sets, respectively) using disjoint subsets of the universe for each. The number of sets is m, the size of the universe is d, and each set is of size`, so we only need to check that for all i 2 m], Recall that the entropy loss of an extractor EXT: f0; 1g n f0; 1g d ! f0; 1g m is defined as = k+d?m, and we can hope for this to be as small as 2 log(1=")+O(1) with d = log(n?k)+O(1) [RT97] .
In constructing our extractor EXTS (u; y) = NWS;u(y), we "threw away" y after using it as a seed for the Nisan-Wigderson generator and hence the d bits of entropy carried by y were lost.
However, the analysis of the Nisan-Wigderson generator actually shows that the quality of the generator is not affected if the seed is revealed. Thus, we define EXT 0 S (u; y) = (y; NWS;u(y)). Now all the analysis of EXT done in Section 4 actually applies to EXT 0 (in Lemma 14, give the predictor A the seed y in addition to NWS;P (y)),
and we obtain the following strengthening of Proposition 15:
Proposition 19 If S = (S1; : : : ; Sm) ( Lemma 21 has two main differences from the one in [WZ95] : First, we use the second extractor on the pair (x; y1) rather than just x; this enables us to make the output length close to k + d1 + d2 rather than just k. Second, the statistical difference from uniform in EXT has a better dependence on s (in [WZ95] , the expression is "1 + "2 + 2 ?s ). Now let us see how Lemma 21 can be used to make our entropy loss optimal. If we use the extractor given by Proposition 20 as EXT1, Lemma 21 tells us that we need only find an extractor EXT2 which works well for very small (i.e., logarithmic) min-entropy. The following extractor of Srinivasan and Zuckerman [SZ98] achieves exactly what we want: 
